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By letter of 28 September 1973 the President of the European Parliament 
authorized the Committee on Development and Cooperation to report on the 
future sugar policy of the Community with particular reference to imports of 
sugar from the developing countries and in the light of the Commission's 
Memorandum of 12 July 1973 (COM(73) 1177). 
The President of the European Parliament also asked the Committee on 
External Economic Relations and the Committee on Agriculture for their 
opinion. 
The Committee on Development and Cooperation appointed Sir Douglas 
DODDS-PARKER rapporteur at its meeting of 8 October 1973. 
It discussed the proposals from the Commission and the rapporteur's 
motion for a resolution at its meetings of 23 October 1973 and 23 November 
1973 and 24 January 1974 and decided to draw up an interim report. 
Following its meeting of 24 January 1974, the Committee on Development 
and Cooperation adopted a motion for a resolution by 7 votes in favour, 
2 against and 3 abstentions. 
On 14 March 1974, before Parliament considered the said motion for a 
resolution attached to the DODDS-PARKER report (Doc. 376/73) and four 
amendments thereto, Parliament decided to refer back to the competent 
committees, the interim report and amendment No. 1 presented by the Committee 
on Agriculture. 
Following consultation of the Committee on Agriculture and the Committee 
on External Economic Relations, the Committee on Development and Cooperation 
adopted, on 2 April 1974, the attached motion for a resolution and explanatory 
statement by nine votes in favour and three abstentions. 
The following were present: Mr ACHENBACH, chairman, Mr NIELSEN, vice-
chairman, Sir Douglas DODDS-PARKER, rapporteur, Mr BAAS (deputizing for 
Mr DURIEUX), Sir Tufton BEAMISH (deputizing for Mr James HILL), Miss FLESCH, 
Mr HARMEGNIES, Mr JOZEAU-MARIGNE, Sir John PEEL, Mr PREMOLI (deputizing for 
Mr NOLAN), Lord REAY, Mr SCHUIJT and Mr SPENALE. 
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A 
The Committee on Development and Cooperation hereby submits to the 
European Parliament the following motion for a resolution together with 
explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the future sugar policy of the Community with particular reference to 
imports of sugar from the developing countries and in the light of the 
Commission's Memorandum of 12 July 1973 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the p:coposals in the Memorandum of the Commission to the 
Council (COM(73) 1177), 
- havinq regard to the moral commitment to safegQard the interests of the 
sugar-producing, less developed countries and the commitment contained 
in the accession Treaty (Protocol 22 III - Mauritius, Fiji, Jamaica, 
Trinidad, Barbados, Guyana, Swaziland, East Africa, Congo/Brazzaville, 
Malagasy) Article 118 (St. Kitts, Belize, Surinam) and the Declaration 
relating to trade with India, 
- having regard to the negotiations with the Protocol No. 22 countries at 
present in progress which ought to be concluded during the first half of 
1974, in order to allow ratification by Member States before the expiry 
of the existing Agreements, 
- in view therefore of the need for the Community to establish its sugar 
policy, both as to the volume of imports of cane sugar from the countries 
mentioned above and as to the details of the new domestic arrangements to 
supersede the present sugar regime which is due to expire in June 1975, 
-- bearing in mind the inability of the Community to agree a sugar policy 
which contributed to the failure of the United Nations conference to 
negotiate a new International Sugar Agreement with economic provisions, 
- bearing in mind that in deciding its future attitude with regard to its 
position on the world sugar market, the EEC should be guided by the share 
it has in responsibility for world food supplies, 
- having regard to the second interim report of the Committee on Development 
and Cooperation and to the opinions of the Committee on External Economic 
Relations and the Committee on Agriculture (Doc. 32/74), 
1. Believes that the Community should guarantee access for imports of 1.4m 
tons of cane sugar per annum from the developing countries referred to 
above; 
Considers that the price at which this quantity is imported should 
be such as to assure reasonable export earnings to the producer 
countries; 
3. Considers that the proposed commitment, by the Commission to 
guarantee access for imports of 1.4m tons from the developing 
countries referred to above should be matched by a commitment by 
these countries to supply such quantities; failure to do so by 
one country could be made good by additional supplies from one or 
more of the other developing countries involved, depending on their 
capacity to export; 
4. Considers, 11ow,:ever, in view on the one hand of recent developments 
on the world market in primary products, and on the other hand of 
the fact that no new World International Sugar Agreement will be 
reached in the immediate future, that it would be premature at 
this juncture to interfere with regard to the substance of the EEC's 
future internal sugar policy; 
5. Abides by its previous view that the Community should participate in 
a new World Sugar Agreement. 
In the meantime, the community should pursue a production and 
marketing policy that l!insures Community supplies, taking into 
account the world market situation and points 1, 2 and 8 of this 
resolution. 
6. Considers that exports of beet sugar from the Community should in 
times of surplus be limited in accordance with agreed quotas and 
in reference to a world price, under the terms of an International 
Sugar Agreement to be signed by the Community. This agreement should 
be signed by the producing countries in order to achieve a balanced 
market. 
7. Considers that there should be reasonable refining margins, both 
for beet and cane sugar, which could be adjusted, if necessary, 
annually; 
8. Invites the commission to make further proposals: 
(a) regarding the need for reserve stocks; 
(b) on the provision of food aid in the form of sugar at a level 
geared to acknowledged requirements; 
(c) for help from the Regional Development and Social Funds for 
any who lose their employment in the refining of cane or beet 
sugar within the Community; 
9. Invites its committees to continue considering these matters and to 
~eport thereon in due cour8€; 
10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the accompanying 
explanatory statement to the Council and Commission of the European 
communities. 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
1. Our committee has taken the initiative in presenting a report on the 
Commission's memorandum of July 1973 which falls under its terms of reference 
because of the deadline..!, involved. 
2. The present Commonwealth Sugar Agreement is due to expire on 31.12.1974 
and the Second Yaounde Convention on 31.1.1975. The negotiations for renew-
ing and enlarging the Association began last October. It is advisable that 
our committee should give its opinion in time for it to be brought to the 
attention of the negotiators dealing with this matter. The question of sugar 
carries considerable importance in the eyes of the producer countries, since 
the solution reached will provide an example for other primary products 
which are crucial in the economy of the associable countries. 
The question of timing is equally important and lies at the very root 
of the sugar question. For example, the Community was not able to play a 
part in the International Sugar Agreement because it had not established its 
position on the Commission's memorandum of 12 July in good time. The absence 
of the Conununity, an important trading partner, was one of the factors 
contributing to the deadlock which the negotiations for the ISA reached on 
13.10.1973. Discussion of unresolved problems must not be deferred on the 
pretext of a deadlock in negotiations, nor must the Community find itself once 
more faced with urgent deadlines without having had the time for calm 
reflection. 
3. The Community 1 s sugar policy will be determined by both political and 
economic factors, the former related to its commitments vis-a-vis developing 
countries steITll~ing from the Accession Treaties, the latter linked with the 
Corrununity's position in world sugar trade and the common agricultural policy. 
As a result, the Community will have to: 
- give effect to agreements vis-a-vis producers belonging to the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement and future associable states contained in the Accession 
Treaties; 
- decide, in the current year 1974 its position on a future world-wide sugar 
agreement; 
decide on the Community's new internal sugar arrangemants subsequent to 
the 1975/76 marketing year. 
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4. The first decision to be taken relates to the commitments stemmins from 
the spirit and letter of Protocol No.22 of the Accession Treaty and from the 
common Declaration of Intent on the development of comi~ercial relations with 
Asian Commonwealth countries. Since the Community's decision must be taken 
within the framework of the international agreement on the enlargement and 
renewal of the Association and given the time required for ratification of 
these agreements, the Community must adopt a final position as soon as 
possible but in any case within the first half of 1974. This is why our 
committee must decide on its position now, even before the committee on 
agriculture states its views. 
5. The new internal sugar regime of the Community constitutes a complex 
and difficult subject on which this committee is not really competent to give 
an opinion. ?his does not, however, mean in the view of your rapporteur, 
that the committee is not competent to give an opinion on other aspects of 
the Commission's memorandum or that our lack of competence over the detailed 
proposals for the internal regime precludes us from expressing our view on 
the question of access to the Community's market for sugar. 
6. Pursuant to Protocol No. 22, part III, the Community gave the following 
commitments: 'The Community will have as its firm purpose the safeguarding 
of the interests of all the countries referred to in this Protocol whose 
economies depend to a considerable extent on the export of primary products, 
and particularly of sugar. 
The question of sugar will be settled within this framework, bearing 
in mind with regard to exports of sugar the importance of this product for 
the economies of several of these countries and of the Commonwealth countries 
in particular' • 
Moreover, the Joint Declaration of Intent on the development of trade 
relations with Ceylon, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Singapore states : 
'The question of exports of sugar from India to the Community after the 
expiry of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement on 31 December 1974 must be 
settlea by the Community in the light of this Declaration of Intent, taking 
account of the provisions which may be adopted as regards imports of sugar 
from the independent Commonwealth countries listed in Protocol No. 22 on 
relations between the European Economic Community and the Associated African 
and Malagasy States and also the independent developing Commonwealth countries 
si·::-.uated in Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean. 
7. These commitments by the Community concern countries for whom sugar 
production is very often vitally important. The decision to be taken is 
therefore related to the Community's policy on development aid. In numerica:i.. 
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terms, these commitments mean that the Community, as the Commission proposes, 
must undertake to import 1,400,000 tons from the above-mentioned countries. 
The tonnages currently imported from the developing countries under the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement are: 
(a) Present imports from Developing Countries under the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement : 
Antilles and Guyana 
Mauritius 
Fiji Islands 
Eastern Africa 
British Honduras 
India 
Swaziland 
(b) Present imports from Surinam: 
(c) Probable imports from the AASM sugar-
producers and exporters 
Madagascar 
Congo 
(d) Total : 1,400,000 t 
696,000 t 
375,000 t 
138,000 t 
7,000 t 
20,000 t 
25,000 t 
84,000 t 
1,345,000 t 
4,000 t 
13,000 t 
38,000 t 
51,000 t 
The above figures reflect the present level of exports from developing 
countries belonging to the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement to the United Kingdom, 
on the one hand, and exports from Surinam, Madagascar and the Congo to the 
Coilli~unity on the other. 
What is the significance of these figures in relation to the production 
and consumption of the enlarged Community? The sugar consumption of the en-
larged EEC forecast for the 1975/76 marketing year is about 10 million tons. 
Since 1971/72 the countries of the Community of Nine have been able, with 
a production of more than 9.6 million tons, to cover their own requirements. 
World consumption is constantly increasing, and at a faster rate than 
production. For example, in 1960 it stood at 56 million tons, of which 56% 
was cane sugar and 44% beet sugar. Consumption was estimated at 53 million 
tons; stocks, at 17 million tons, represented 32 % of annual consumption. 
Prices were consequently very low. By 1970/71 marketing· year, i.e. ten years 
later, a major change had occurred: consumption had increased by 43 °lo and 
production by only 31"/o; stocks had fallen to 24% of consumption and prices 
had risen by 57 o/o. In the last quarter of 1973 consumption, estimated at 
about 77 million tons, was 4 million tons greater than production; stocks 
were at their lowest level (sufficient to cover 70 days' consumption, in some 
countries only 15 days) and prices at their highest. In addition, experts 
estimate that world demand will rise by 20-30 million tons over the next 
seven to ten years. In replying to Mr Vredeling's written question of 22 
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March 1972, the Commission of the Communities ac1~itted that world consumption 
could surpass 100 million tons by 1985. 
8. Your rapporteur believes that the enlarged Community can commit itself 
to import 1.4 million tons of cane sugar without jeopardizing the incomes of 
community sugar beet producers. This volume would be less than present total 
volume of imports of cane sugar into the Nine member countries. Domestic 
producers are at present experiencing extremely high prices due to the world 
shortage of sugar and in addition attention has also been drawn (see paragraph 
7) to the trends in per capita world consumption of sugar 
up to 1970/71 and the future estimates. 
9. The Commission has proposed that in the interests of the supplying 
countries, the Community should guarantee to import the tonnage in question. 
If these developing countries are to obtain a comparable degree of security 
of access to that which they were accorded, for example, under the Common-
wealth Sugar Agreement, your rapporteur believes that the Committee on 
Development and Co-operation should endorse this proposal. On the other hand, 
it would seem indispensable that in return the future agreement should 
commit '.:..he contracting countries to supply the quantity of sugar in question. 
If one country should fail to do so, or be prevented by 'force majeure', one 
or more of the other contracting countries should make good the supply, 
according to their export capacities. 
10. On the question of prices, the Commission's memorandum refers to the 
two yardsticks, namely: current prices under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement 
and the lowest price applicable in the Community. The Commission then 
proposes that the sugar from the developing countries would be purchased at 
the c.i.f. world market price, with the proviso that this purchase price 
could not exceed the lowest price applicable in the Community. 
1'he rapporteur believes that the Committee should not attempt to give an 
opinion on the very complex question of the price basis on which the prices 
should be negotiated. This is a matter which should be settled by the 
negotiators. It is, however, important,and the Corrunittee should insist,that 
the Community should guarantee to pay producers in the countries concerned a 
fair and profitable price for the quantities imported. 
11. A second decision must be taken on the part the Community is to play 
in an International Sugar Agreement. 
Our committee considered that, given the Community's considerable 
weight as the largest exporter of white sugar on the international market, 
it should play a part in the future ISA and even take the initiative in 
resuming negotiations. 
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12. The Commission believes that it would be possible for the Conununity to 
accede to a new I.S.A. provided the Council decided that Community production 
should not1 in principle, exceed internal consumption less the tonnage import-
ed under Protocol 22, plus 800,000 metric tons to be exported to the world 
market. This limitation on exports would apply in normal conditions, whereas 
in conditions of world shortage and low stock, as at present, the Community 
would be able to export increased quantities. 
The developing countries expect that the Community's arrangements for 
importing 1.4 million tons will provide a comparable degree of security of 
access as that which they enjoy under, for example, the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement. This means that their sugar exports should form part of the 
Community's requirements for domestic consumption. If the:r sugar were to 
be simply re-exported to the world market 1 then access to the Community would 
not be secure since it would not be filling a gap between supply and demand. 
The Committee on Development and Co-operation considers that in the future 
and under normal conditions of market supplies and demand the Community's 
domestic production would have to be determined in the light of this 
objective and of the guarantee to import 1.4 million tons of cane sugar. 
13. In the present economic situation, to discourage Community proauction 
might increase the existing shortage on the international market and cause 
a sharper rise in world prices. This would be detrimental to the interests 
of the developing countries which are the EEC's main clients; similarly, in 
view of the Community's need for security of supply and the steady increase 
in its sugar consumption,some expansion of production seems more likely than 
any Malthusian development. 
Equally, it would be wrong to discourage production in the developing 
countries that belong to the CSA or OCAM sugar agreement as they make a 
major contribution to the world market, and in particular, towards meeting 
the requirements of a number of other developing countries. 
Negotiations for a future ISA should take all these facts into consider-
ation and enable the Community to commit itself to this agreement without 
fear of jeopardizing the interests of its producers. Your rapporteur con-
siders that the ISA should also involve regional agreements and cover the 
movement of refined as well as unrefined sugar and the creation of a buffer 
stock which could also be used for regulatory purposes. 
14. Apart from these general problems, there is the question of refining the 
sugar produced in developing countries, which at the moment, is mainly 
refined in the Community. The exports do not recommend setting up refineries 
in the exporting countries, stressing the technical problems which would 
arise and the fact that only a small number of jobs would be created. 
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15. 'I'hc Commi u_oe on external econom.Lc relations wonders whclher it is 
w.13t.! Lo conL.inuo supportiny u. non-diversified economy based on sugar 
production in these countries, thus leaving them prone to crises. Experts 
have replied by stressing the highly labour-intensive nature of sugar 
production, the resulting effect on employment and the hitherto unsuccessful 
attempts to diversify the economies of these countries. 
16. The capacity of refineries in the United Kingdom, in particular, must 
also be taken into consideration. These refineries wer set up to take imports 
of unrefined sugar from the Commonwealth and technically meet requirements. 
In addition, the U.K. refineries employ a large proportion of the labour 
force in regions where they are the dominant economic activity so that 
roducinq o;:: eliminating them would be likely to increase local unemployment. 
However, t9 reserve a certain amount for free competition between all refine-
ries (pure and ancillary refineries), it would seem wise to establish 
refining quotas for specialised refineries and calculate refinery margins 
in the way suggested by the Cowmission. (See§ 25 of the Sugar memorandum). 
Co,1clusions 
To honour the commitments it entered into in the Accession Treaties, 
the Community must be prepared to import 1. 4 million tons of sugar fror:t tLe 
developing countries in question, i.e. members of the CSA and the OC&'vl sugar 
agceement. 
It should also meet the implicit moral obligation under Protocol No.22 
and purchase these quantities of sugar from the developing countries at fair 
and profitable prices, under procedures to be established and on the basis 
of the machinery proposed by the Commission. 
'rhe Community should, moreover, take the initiative of launching an 
in~ernational sugar agreement really capable of bringing about a permanent 
adjustment in world supply and demand in a manner acceptable to both producers 
and consumers. This means that the ISA would have to cover not only its 
present members and the Community as such - and hence Member states that do 
not at present belong - but also the members of the regional agreements. 
Finally, the Corrmiission should supplement its memorandum and produce figures 
and current trends in world production and consumption, broken down by 
country. On the basis of these precise data, the Commission should as soon 
as possible draw up proposals for a new Community sugar market organization 
that takes account of the Corrununity' s con1,,uitments to certai_ri_ developing 
countries, the position it may occupy within the future ISA, and developing 
trends in production and consumption within the Community. 
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Opinion of the Committee on External Economic Relations 
Draftsman: Mr M. BANGEMANN 
On 28 September 1973 the Committee on External Economic Relations 
appointed Mr BANGEMANN draftsman of the opinion. 
The draft opinion was discussed by the committee at its meeting of 
28 November 1973 and adopted with 3 votes against and 1 abstention. 
The following were present: Mr de la Malene, chairman; Mr Boano, 
vice-chairman; Mr Bangemann, draftsman; Mr Baas, Sir Tufton Beamish, 
Mr Bourdelles, Mr Dewulf, Mr Kaspereit, Mr de Koning, Mr Lange, Lord 
Lothian, Sir John Peel, Mr Radoux, Mr Rossi, Mr Sandri, Mr Scholten and 
Mr Thiry. 
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I. Introduction 
1. The European Community was once again left with little time to act in 
th€ negotiations on the International Sugar Agreement (ISA) as a result of 
the slowness of the decision-making procedures of the Member States and the 
Community institutions. Although the dates for the negotiations had already 
been known for a long time, the Commission did not submit its memorandum on 
the EEC's future sugar policy until 12 July 1973, i.e. after the close of the 
first round of talks on the ISA. By the last day of the second round the 
Council had still not reached agreement on a uniform Community attitude. 
Despite its important role as a world market partner, therefore, the EEC was 
not represented at the negotiating table. 
2. However, the breakdown of these talks in Geneva on 13 October 1973 
should not under any circumstances be allowed to lead to a further postpone-
ment of discussions on the unsolved problems until new and pressing deadlines 
once again give rise to a similar situation. Basically, therefore, the 
Committee on External Economic Relations is pleased that the committee 
responsible has kept this item on the agenda even though the report may not 
at present arouse the desired interest in Parliament. 
3, The next deadlines for a Community sugar policy are 31 December 1974 
(expiry of the present Commonwealth Sugar Agreement) and 31 January 1975 
(expiry of the Yaounde convention). In addition, the temporary production 
arrangements governing the Communities' internal sugar policy expire at the 
end of the financial year 1974/75. (Given the special features of the sugar 
market, new production arrangements must be finalized before September 1974). 
II. Basic .problems of the Community's future ~gar pqlicy 
4. The Community's future sugar policy is decisively influenced by political 
and external and other economic factors, which ultimately shape internal 
sugar policy. The basic problems involved here require decisions in 
particular on: 
the future position of the EEC in the world market; 
- the obligations arising out of the treaties of accession; and 
- the measures to be adopted for regulating the internal Community 
sugar market. 
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(a) The future external economic position of the European Community 
in_the_World_sugar_market _____________________________________ _ 
5. Crucial to sugar policy is the question whether the Community will in 
future be a net exporter or a net importer in the world market. The answer 
will not only govern its negotiating position as regards the ISA and the 
Commonwealth countries but, in particular, it will also determine internal 
sugar policy. 
The present world market situation makes a decision difficult since it 
is impossible to say whether the inadequacy of mgar supplies is due to 
conjunctural or structural causes in the production sector. This uncertainty 
was also the reason for the breakdown of the Geneva negotiations. 
6. Since Community production meets the demand in Member States, politics 
play a more important role than external economic considerations in any 
decision for the Community to absorb part of the production from the devel-
oping countries. However, such a decision can only be justified if the 
Community sugar policy and the internal sugar market are flexible enough to 
compensate, by means of adequate storage and by production increases, any 
excess demand on the world market and the resultant unsatisfied demand in the 
Community. 
(b) Obligations arising out of the treaties of accession with the three 
new Member States 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Ultimately, the Community is no longer free in its decision on 
whether to import given quantities of sugar from the developing countries. 
It is obliged, in letter and spirit, by Protocol No. 22 of the Act of 
Accession and by the Joint Declaration of Intent on the development of 
trade relations with the developing countries of the Commonwealth in Asia, 
to take sugar exports from these countries into account. 
8. Thus, Part III of Protocol No. 22 reads as follows: 
'The Community will have as its firm purpose the safeguarding of 
the interests of all the countries referred to in this protocol 
whose economies depend to a considerable extent on the export of 
primary products, and particularly of sugar. 
The question of sugar will be settled within this framework, 
bearing in mind with regard to exports of sugar the importance 
of this product for the economies of several of these countries 
and of the Commonwealth :countries in particular.' 
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Moreover, the Joint Declaration of Intent on the development of trade 
relations with Ceylon, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Singapore states: 
'The question of exports of sugar from India to the Community after 
the expiry of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement on 31 December 1971 
must be settled by the Community in the light of this declaration 
of intent, taking account of the provisions which may be adopted 
as regards imports of sugar from the independent Commonwealth 
countries listed in Protocol No. 22 on relations between the 
European Economic Community and the Associated African and 
Malagasy States and also the independent developing Commonwealth 
countries situated in Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean 
and the Caribbean'. 
9. It should be noted that the abovementioned obligations entered into 
by the Community relate mainly to countries for which sugar production is 
vital. The decision to assume these obligations therefore forms part of 
the Community's development aid policy. It should also be remembered that, 
within the context of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, Great Britain has 
hitherto been one of the most important importing partners of the countries 
,ncerned and will continue to play tnis role in the enlarged Community. 
Hence, as far as the original six Member States are concerned, imports will 
in practice be kept to a minimum. 
10. As is the case with other agricultural products, the market for sugar 
must also be officially regulated. This means that here too extensive admini-
strative machinery will be required. The regulation of sugar production in 
the Member States necessitated by the Community's position as a net importer 
can be achieved either by fixing a uniform price for all sugar beer production 
or by a quota system. 
11. Current calculations show below that regulation of production at the 
present time would have to include a 25% reduction in prices to the existing 
level. The resulting cessation of production in regions less suited to beet 
growing would have severe negative effects both from the social point of 
view and from the point of view of investments in the sugar industry. In 
view of this and in the light of experience with the present system of 
market regulations, a quota system seems to be the most suitable way of 
controlling production and achieving the desired objective. This and 
other details of the internal sugar policy will be dealt with in a later 
section. 
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III. The Commission's proposals on future sugar policy 
12. In its memorandum on the future sugar policy the Commission of 
the European Communities largely dealt with the above basic problems 
and submitted proposals on 
- the Community's position in the negotiations on an international 
sugar agreement, 
- the negotiations with the countries of the Commonwealth and the AASM and 
- the structure of the Community's internal sugar policy. 
(a) the_Community's __ ~osition_in_a_new_international_su~ar_a~reement 
13. Although this year's talks on the ISA broke down, they will 
probably be re-opened in two years at the latest. This deadline and 
the fundamental content of the Commission's proposals, therefore, 
remain relevant to the Community's future sugar policy. 
14. Some countries think that the present agreement is largely 
ineffective since the mechanisms it provides have been overtaken by 
developments in the world sugar market, since it fails to give the 
poorer countries adequate guarantees of stable revenue, and since it 
does not cover several important trade partners in the world market etc. 
The Commission therefore thinks it advisable not to seek an extension 
of the present agreement but to participate, in accordance.with the wishes 
of the majority, in the negotiation of a new agreement. 
15. The Commission suggests that it should enter into the new agreement 
as a net importer. It should be stressed that these obligations come 
into effect only within the framework of quotas for certain countries 
when a particu~ar supply situation exists in the world market. This 
political decision appears reasonable in the light of the provisions of 
the Treaty of Accession, the Yaounde convention and the Community 
development aid policy, with the above reservation that the Community 
sugar policy should be flexible enough to permit timely compensation of 
any shortage by means of the necessary increases in production. 
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(b) T'ne_Communitl~s_attitude_to_the countries_of the_Commonwealth_an§ 
the MSM 
16. As mentioned above, the Community's attitude is already basically 
fixed by Protocol No. 22 of the Act of Accession, by the relevant joint 
declaration of intent and by the obligations entered into in respect of 
the MSM. Hence, only quantitative supply and the practical form of 
the Treaty relations with the countries concerned are of interest here. 
17. Although no precise quantities are mentioned in the above basic 
agreements, it can be calculated that with the accession of Great 
Britain - the main importer of sugar from the developing Commonwealth 
countries - 1.4 million tons of sugar will be imported into the 
enlarged Community if exports from the Commonwealth countries and 
the sugar-exporting countries of the AASM remain constant. According 
to the Commission proposals, 800,000 t. of sugar, which the Community_ 
itself exports, can be substracted from this amount, making the 
Community a net importer of 600,000 t. 
18. Two more fundamental questions are of importance in addition to 
this quantitative problem: 
- the maintenance of single-crop cultivation, 
- the possible establishment of refineries in the supplying countries. 
Is it advisable to continue supporting a one-sided and precarious 
bias towards sugar production in the countries concerned? The experts 
point to the labour-intensive nature of sugar production and its 
important role in employment policy, and to the hitherto unsuccessful 
attempt at diversification in these countries. In this connection, 
the Committee on External Economic Relations believes that the. 
competent Community institutions should conduct their own investigations, 
leading perhaps to a reorientation of Community policy. 
The experts are not in favour of the setting up of refineries in 
the supplying countries since these would create only a small number 
of jobs and would give rise to various technical problems. The 
Committee on External Economic Relations would also welcome suitable 
Comrrrunity investigations into this matter. 
19. The Commission's other proposals relate to the practical content, of 
Treaty relations - price determination, purchase and supply guarantees, 
import and processing machinery, intervention measures etc. 
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(c} The_structure_of_the_Conununity's_internal_su~ar_policy 
20. The Conunission's proposals include measures for maintaining a 
specific level of production in existing beet-growing areas, for 
promoting specialization, and for adapting the level of production to 
potential sales outlets. The latter measures are of particular.interest 
to the Conunittee on External Economic Relations. 
The abovementioned quota system is of crucial importance in 
regulating Conununity sugar production and gearing it to potential 
outlets, taking into account the Conununi~yls international obligations. 
Such control would be effected by fixing a maximum quota for each,under; 
taking in addition to the basic quota. Provided there was no shortage 
on the world market, production in excess of themaximumquota could 
not be disposed of either inside or outside the Conununity and would 
consequently have to be carried over to the following marketing year. 
The necessary flexibility would be ensured by reviewing and, if need 
be, changing the maximum quotas at the end of the marketing year. 
21. The flexibility of the entire Conununity system depends largely 
on this annual review of production as a whole and on the world market 
situation. In view of the difficulties and the time involved in 
obtaining the necessary data, processing this information and making 
forecasts on the basis of it, and in view of the slowness of the Council's 
decision-making procedure, the Conunittee on External Economic Relations 
is unable to share the Conunission's optimistic view of the flexibility 
of the Conununity sugar policy. 
Since there are no suitable alternatives, the Conunittee on 
External Economic Relations requests the Conunission to build up an 
efficient information system which will ensure that reliable data on 
developments in the sugar market can be obtained and processed smoothly. 
Furthermore, it seems essential to keep adequate reserves for use in 
the event of incorrect forecasts, catastrophes, and unexpected 
shortages on the world market etc. 
IV. Conclusions 
22. The Committee on External Economic Relations draws attention to the 
fact that the Commission was late in drafting and forwarding its 
memorandum on the Conununity's future sugar policy and would in future like 
to see the European Parliament informed and consulted on such important 
questions at an earlier stage. 
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Having regard to the Commission's proposals and explanations, 
and with the proviso that the Community's future sugar policy should 
not fix the position of the Community as a net importer for all world 
market situations, but should aim at flexible adaptation by means 
of the suspension of the relevant control measures, the Committee on 
External Economic Relations approves in principle the present propos9,J.s 
on negotiating positions as regards a new ISA and vis-a-vis the 
Commonwealth and AASM countries, and the structure of the internal 
sugar policy. 
Opinion of the Committee on Agriculture 
Draftsman Mr MARTENS for the opinion 
By letter of 28 September 1973 the President of the European 
Parliament requested the Committee on Agriculture to deliver an 
opinion on this Memorandum. 
On 25 September 1973 Mr MARTENS was appointed draftsman\ 
of the opinion. 
The attached opinion was considered at the meetings of 21 and 28 
February 1974 and adopted unanimously at the latter meeting with 1 
abstention. 
The following were present: Mr Vetrone, vice-chairman and acting 
chairman; Mr Martens, draftsman; Mr Berthoin (deputizing for Mr Durieux), 
Mr Bourdelles (deputizing for Mr Baas), Mr Bregegere (deputizing for 
Mr Kavanagh), Mr Brugger, Mr Della Briotta (deputizing for Mr Cifarelli), 
Mr Frehsee, Mr Frlih, Mr Gibbons, Mr Harmegnies (deputizing for Miss 
Lulling), Mr Heger, Mr John Hill, Mr De Koning, Mr Lefebvre, Mr Lemoine, 
Mr Ligios, Mr Nielsen (deputizing for Mr Houdet), Mrs Orth, Lord St. 
Oswald. 
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I - Prel iminaEY._2:."emarks 
1. The Committee on Agriculture wishes at the outset to draw attention 
to two limitations that have been taken as a basis in drafting this 
opinion: 
it is intended to give only an initial and general assessment of the 
Commission's Memorandum (in the same way as the committee responsible 
is putting forward only an interim report); 
- the external aspects of the EEC's sugar policy cannot in fact be 
divorced, in either formal or material terms, from its internal aspects. 
The Committee on Agriculture is nonetheless refraining, in 
this instance, from offering any opinion on the internal aspects, in 
respect of which it hopes - as soon as definite proposals 
have been submitted for the final organization of the sugar market (due 
to come into force in time for the 1975/76 marketing year) - to be laying 
a separate report before Parliament in the capacity of committee 
responsible. 
This comment is of course in no way negated by the fact that 
reference is sometimes, necessarily, made to the internal aspects in 
order to support conclusions on the aspects at present being considered. 
II - External aspects of the EEC I s sugar policy 
2. Since the accessions of 1973, the Community's external sugar policy 
falls under three heads: 
(a) trade with the associated ('Yaounde') developing countries and with 
those ('Commonwealth') developing countries elig·ible for association; 
(b) trade with other third countries; 
In both instances these will involve either sugar-exporting or 
sugar-importing countries; 
(c) the International Sugar Agreement (ISA). 
A.s far as procedures are concerned, the situation has undergone 
certain changes since the Memorandum was drafted: 
- negotiations were opened in the autumn of 1973 with the Associated 
and associable States on the renewal of the Second Yaounde Convention, 
due to expire on 31 January 1975, and on the commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement, which expires at virtually the same time (31 December 1974). 
- negotiations on a renewal of the ISA of 1968 were broken off at the end 
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of October 1973 without any result having been achieved, so that at the 
moment there is no organization of the market at world level, apart 
from certain administrative provisions; all there is is the intention of 
resuming negotiations in 1975. 
III - Trade with the developing countries 
3. Imports into the united Kingdom from the Commonwealth developing 
countries referred to in Protocol No. 22 to the Act of Accession 
(i.e. all the Commonwealth countries party to the 1951 Sugar Agreement, 
with the exception of Australia and Rhodesia) amount to about 1.35 million 
metric tons (expressed in terms of white suaar). 
Imports from the AASM and OCT countries (Madagascar, Congo-Brazzaville 
and SurinamJ 1 total about 55,000 tons 2 . 
The overall figure is thus in the region of 1.4 million tons3 . 
4. The nub of the Memorandum is contained in the proposal to guarantee 
the taking-up of these 1. 4 million tons or so at fixed prices, which 
would have to be offset by guaranteed exports from the EEC to the world 
4 
market - within the framework of the ISA - of 800,000 tons (Memorandum, 
para. 30). In other words the EEC would, on balance, take a net import 
of 600,000 tons. 
IV - Trade with other third countries and the ISA 
1 
2 
5. All that needs to be said under this heading in the present 
connection is that it is regulated by means of levies and repayments. 
It must be remembered that the world market situation has changed 
in such a way that since the end of November 1973 exports from the EEC 
have had to be cut back by instituting an export levy of around 
To these must be added Mauritius, now associated with the EEC, whose 
total exports in 1972 came to about 200,000 tons. The 1972 exports of 
Madagascar, Congo-Brazzaville and Surinam were 40,000 tons, 10,000 tons 
and nil, respectively. 
Memorandum, statistical annex. 
3 As Mauritius is listed in Annex VI to the Act of Accession, its sugar 
exports are included in the 1.35 million tons from the Commonwealth 
countries. 
4 These figures are derived from (i) an internal production of about 9.2 
million tons plus (ii) the guaranteed import of 1.4 million tons, 
together corresponding to (iii) a. forecast internal consumption of 9 .8 
million tons (Memorandum, para. 14). 
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30 u.a./100 kg1 
6. As regards fresh discussion on a new ISA in 1975, it will be 
enough in this opinion to refer to the g·eneral conclusions. These 
will naturally need to be specified more precisely when the time., 
comes, once a better picture of long-term developments on the world 
market has been obtained. 
V - Conclusions 
7. The Committee on Agriculture considers it would be wise, in 
offering this opinion, to adopt a 'wait-and-see' attitude. 
In coming to this conclusion it is persuaded first of all by recent 
unexpected developments on the world market, the duration of which is 
still quite impossible to predict. It may certainly be conceded that 
a world market policy should not be governed by minor fluctuations in 
the overall sugar supply; and it may further be pointed out that the 
ISA covers only one half of the total trade in the world (about 
20 million tons a year), i.e. only the surpluses from the traditional 
2 (contractual) trading pattern 
It does seem, however, that at the moment all the primary product 
markets - including that in foodstuffs - are passing through a trans-
itional phase that cannot be described in terms of minor fluctuations 3 . 
8. The Committee on Agriculture also draws attention to the figures 
for internal consumption quoted in the Memorandum. These indicate an 
upward trend which, though admittedly not spectacular, is quite steady 
and amounts to e.t least some· 100,000 tons .a year. At all events the 
Commission is forecasting exactly the same annual increase up to 1976. 
This increase is in fact covered by the productivity increase. 
9. As stated in para. 29 of the Memorandum, world production was 
substantially in excess of production in 1969/70, although from 
1970/71 this turned into a shortfall which resulted in most of the 
stocks being used up. This situation stems from a rise in consumption 
greater than that in production. Unless prices have an inhibiting 
effect world consumption is expected to increase by 3% a year, and the 
question then would be whether production would be able to keep pace. 
1Regulation 3150/73, OJ No. L 321 of 22 November 1973 
2
oelivered under the US Sugar Act, the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, 
the bilateral Cuba-USSR Agreement, the OCAM Sugar Agreement, etc., 
three-quarters of the world's sugar production of about 80 million 
tons is consumed where it is produced. 
3 
cf. also the temporary export levy on cereals in the EEC 
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In other words, we shall have to wait and see what level world prices 
will reach in the near future. 
10. In this connection the Committee on Agriculture comes, at all 
events, to the conclusion that the statistics put forward in the 
Memorandum and those used at the Sugar Conferenc~ must be described as 
very scanty. 
Whilst recognizing that in its Memorandum the Commission sets out 
merely to show how internal production might have to be limited if the 
need arises, and is not suggesting that this is already called for at 
the present time, the committee is not convinced that this is the right 
time to consider whether, over the next few years, the EEC should become 
a net exporter or a net importer on the world market. 
11. The real question is perhaps rather what responsiblity it must 
assume for the world sugar (food) supply. Here ore thinks on the one 
hand of those developing countries with which the EEC has special ties 
(which should preferably be matched by a responsibility on the part of 
other developed nations towards the remaining developing countries), 
and on the other of fulfilling this responsibility in the form of 
financial aid or in kind {papital investment in refining on the spot, 
diversification, stabiliz:ati.on o:£ prices,, etc.) ; these aspects should 
gradually be worked out in greater detail. 
12. The Committee on Agriculture therefore feels at this stage that 
the commitments under Protocol No. 22 to the Act of Accession (toward~ 
the countries listed in Annex VI to that Act) ought effectively to be 
carried out. The same is true of commitments towards the AASM and 
OCT countries. 
It is therefore in general agreement with the scheme set out in 
paras. 21 to 27 of the Memorandum with regard to import (price) 
arrangements, the proposals on refining and those on possible compensation 
payments if export earnings fail to reach the reference level. 
The committee believes, finally, that the Community should be 
prepared to continue the provision of food aid in the form of sugar on 
an undiminished scale and, if necessary, to step up such aid1 
13. The committee cannot, however, accept without reservation the 
arguments put forward in para. 22 of the Memorandum in connection with 
the undertakings to supply sugar to be given by the Commonwealth and 
Yaounde countries. 
1Regulation 1475/72 (OJ No. L 157/72) et seq. 
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Though recognizing that the EEC will be able, even in the near 
future, to cover internal consumption from its own production, the 
, .... mmittee wonders whether in planning the balanced situation which lies 
at t'1e core of this Memorandum on sugar too much reliance has not been 
placed on the absolute assurance of a constant supply of the 1.4 million 
tons mentioned in para. 30; even a measure of collective responsibility 
for these supplies on the part of the developing countries in question 
would, in the Committee's view, seem to offer an insufficient guarantee 
in certain circumstances (such as the price situation on the world 
market) that the Community will actually receive its supply1 And in 
the last analysis it is still uncertain whether all the sugar-exporting 
countries of the Commonweal·t:h would be willing to subscribe to the 
proposed arrangement. Yet so long as no new International Sugar 
Agreement has been concluded, and the status of the EEC as a net 
importer or exporter has not been legally decided, developments which 
may affect the stability of these sugar supplies remain an unknown 
quantity. 
14. Summing up, the Committee on Agriculture asks the committee 
responsible to include in its motion for a resolution passages that 
might be worded as follows: 
(i) Considers it important that the EEC, in deciding its future 
attitude with regard to its position on the world sugar market, 
should be guided principally by the share it has in world 
responsibility for world food supplies; 
(ii) Considers however, in view on the one hand of recent developments 
on the world market in primary products, including foodstuffs, 
and on the other hand of the fact that no new World International 
Sugar Agreement will be reached in the immediate future, that it 
would be wrong at this juncture to interfere with regard to the 
substance of the EEC's future internal sugar policy; 
(iii) Maintains the standpoint previously expressed by Parliament that 
the Community ought to take part in a new International Sugar 
Agreement, although wishing at this stage to reserve its position 
on whether (and if so, to what extent) the Community should 
eventually be a net importer or a net e~porter vis-a-vis the 
world market; 
(iv) considers that, if the Community is to achieve the highest 
possible degree of stability in its supplies and the prices paid 
1
cf. Guyana's restrictions on exports to the UK at the end of 
January 1974. 
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for them, it is at this moment both wrong and undesirable to 
base the balancing of the Community's sugar situation on an 
absolutely fixed import of 1.4 million tons from the 
developing countries with which the Community has special ties; 
(v) Declares already at this stage, however, that the Community 
ought fully to accept the consequences of its commitments towards 
the sugar-exporting developing countries of the Commonwealth as 
well as towards the Yaounde countries; 
(vi) Urges, furthermore, that the Community should continue, and if 
necessary expand, the provision of food aid in the form of sugar. 
(vii) Cr~.:;:id,,1·,: t.hat, 11 l:he production of sugar cane increases in 
countrJcs where it forms the main source of income, these countries 
must be helped to refine the sugar locally, instead of increasing 
the manufacturing potential in the industrialized countries. 
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A 
The Committee on Agriculture hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the proposal from the 
Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a regulation laying 
down the conditions for granting national aid under the common structural 
policy for seafishing 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the proposal from the Commission of the European 
Communities to the Council (1), 
- having been consulted by the Council pursuant to Article 43(2) of the EEC 
Treaty (Doc. 242/73); 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Agriculture (Doc. 33/74); 
- aware that a strong fishing sector, embracing the fleets of the Member 
States, is necessary to safeguard the standard of living of the fishing 
population and to protect the interests of the consumer; 
recalling the past desire of the Committee on Agriculture, as expressed in 
2 
1968 in the report drawn up by Mr KRIEDEMANN, to see the Commission's 
structural policy for the fishing industry give greater encouragement to 
the development of producer organizations; 
- believing that the common rules here proposed for the implementation of the 
provisions of Article 9 of the Regulation (EEC) No. 2141/70 on a common 
structural policy for the fishing industry raise questions of broad policy; 
1. Approves the Commission's proposals, and awaits provisions for the further 
development of a true common structural policy in the fishing industry; 
2. Welcomes the decision of the Commission to encourage producer organizations 
by means of special derogations from the proposed common financial rules; 
3. Recognises the necessity to safeguard the interests of unfavoured regions 
in the process of aid harmonization; 
4. Believes that proposals to develop a structural policy on seafishing in the 
Community, and in particular common rules to govern aids to the fishing 
industry should be framed in terms of the international competition faced 
by the Community producer, as well as in terms of harmonization of levels 
of aid granted by Member States; 
1 O.J. No. C 110, 13.12.1973, p. 50 
2 O.J. No. C 116, 8.11.1968, p. 12 
5. Requests that further consideration be given to the definition of producer 
organizations as referred to in Article 7 of this proposed regulation: 
6. Considers that it would be advisable to establish a ceiling on permitted 
aids for processing and marketing under Article 3(c), as well as a 
percentage limitation, in order that aid should be directed to the smaller 
groupings rather than the very large producer; 
7. Believes that a ceiling should be established on aids to compensate for 
losses incurred in the search for new fishing grounds; 
8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report of the 
committee to the Council and the Commission of the European Communities. 
B 
EXPLANA'l'OR.Y STATEMENT 
1. Regulation (EEC) No. 2141/70 of 20 October 1970 laid down a common 
structural policy for the fishing industry. 
Article 9, paragraph 2, of that regulation, stated that common rules 
fixing the conditions for grants of financial aid from Member States 
for the restructuring of the fishing industry should be laid down. 1 
The purpose of this proposed regulation is to give effect to that 
provision. (It does not seek to establish a system of Community grants.) 
2. The types of fishing covered by this proposed regulation, given in 
Article 2 (1) of Regulation 1939/72, are as follows: 
1. Local inshore fishing (average time out: less than 2 days) 
2. Offshore fishing (average time out from 2 to less than 9 days) 
3. High-sea fishing (average time out: from 9 to less than 22 days) 
4. Deep-sea fishing (average time out: 22 days and over) 
5. Specialized fishing. 
3. Regulation (EEC) No. 2141/70 defined the appropriate measures to be 
authorized for this policy of furthering the rational development of 
the seafishing industry, as follows: 
- increased productivity through restructuring of fishing fleets; 
- adaptatio~ of production and marketing installations; 
- the improvement of the living standards and conditions of those 
in the fishing industry. 
4. The present proposals are framed so as to limit distortions to free 
competition caused by differences in levels of aid granted by national 
governments. The main purpose of this proposed regulation is to fix 
the maximum amounts of aid in the form of capital subsidies which may 
be granted by Member States for the restructuring of the seafishing 
industry. 
l The date limit originally established, l June 1971, for the 
fixing of thesa~conditions was put back to allow the three new Member 
States to participate in their formulation. 
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However, the requirements of certain regions where the structural 
conditions are particularly unfavourable with regard to the activities in 
fisheries and the desirability of encouraging producers' organizations are 
taken into consideration in the form of limited derogations from the general 
limitations. 
5. The common rules included in this proposed regulation contain, in 
addition, certain selective technical and economic provisions. 
Limitations on Grants of National Financial Aid 
G. One of the main purposes of the proposed regulation is to prevent 
,_stortion of competition caused by grants of financial aid by Member States 
i:o their fishing sector. 
This harmonization of national aid programmes is to be achieved by 
defining the operations for which aid may be granted (Articles 2 - 7) , the 
form of aid allowed (Article 1.2) and the amounts of aid permitted (Articles 
5 - 10) • 
7. Aid may be granted for the following operations : 
- the restructuring of fishing fleets (the purchase and fitting out of 
new fishing yessels, and their modernization or decommissioning, as 
well as the construction or improvement of fish breeding plants); 
- the search for new fishing grounds (compensation for search losses* 
research costs or stocking installations) 
the adaption of production and marketing (for sorting, preparing, 
chilling and freezing, processing and storing catches on board and 
on shore, for the exploitation of fishery by-products on board and 
research on fish technology); 
- the improvement of the standard of living of the fishing population 
by means of vocational training. 
8. The forms of aid permitted are: capital subsidies, loans at reduced 
rates of interest, interest rate subsidies or loan and interest guarantees. 
9. The maximum amounts of aid permitted have been established by category 
in the following manner: 
PE 35. 521 /fin. 
(A) For measures corr.: erned with the restructuring of fishing fleets given 
in Article 2 of the proposed regulation : 
(a) the purchase and fitting out of new fishing vessels 
(b) the modernization of fishing vessels 
(c) the decommissioning of fishing vessels 
(d) the construction, equipment or modernization of installations 
for the breeding of fish or shellfish in salt or brackish 
water 
aid, expressed in terms of capital subsidies, may not exceed an amount 
equal to: 
18% of actual costs for vessels equipped for various methods 
of fishing 
15% for vessels engaged exclusively in trawling, seining or 
tunny fishing 
except aids relating to operations coming under Article 2 (A) (d) which 
may not exceed 10% of the actual costs. 
(B) Aid relating to operations specified in Article 3, the search for new 
fishing grounds and new methods of fishing, may not exceed 15%. 
The Fishing Industry in the Communities 
10. This fishing industry provides a valuable complement to the other 
agricultural sectors, both as a source of high protein food and as 
fish meal fertilizer. At a time when food prices have undergone an 
exceptionally sharp increase, and other forms of fertilizers (such 
as phosphates) are becoming increasingly in short supply, the possibi-
lities offered by the fishing sector have taken on added importance. 
Per capita consumption of all types of fish in the Six increased 
from 10.8 kg in 1960 to ll.6 in 1970; the increase in t.he frozen and 
prepared products sector was even more notable. 
11. On the other hand, the balance between supply and demand has been 
1 
deteriorating as consumption overtakes production. One result has 
been a decrease in the self-sufficiency of the Community of Six in 
fish, from 95% in 1960 to 75% in 1970: 1 
The Agricultural Situation in the EEC for 1972, Volume II, part II, 
pp. 160-164. 
- 9 - PE 35.521/fin. 
EEC (Six) 1000 tons 
Imports Exports 
1966 285 52 
I 1970 337 50 
I 
12. The increasing demand for fish is reflected in the increasing use of 
the :tong range multi-purpose vessel and the zones in which fish is 
caught. By far the greater proportion of fish is caught in the North 
East Atlantic, 1 with vessels going further, remaining longer at sea 
and carrying out much of the processing at sea. The process of 
adjustment of the fleets of the Community to the demands of the market, 
however, is long and costly. 
13. There are three main types of fishing: commercial, self-employed and 
inshore. The distribution of these different types of fishing 
between the Member States of the Communities is very unequal. In 
Ireland, for example, the fishing fleet is regarded exclusively as 
inshore (with only two vesels over 90 feet, one 91 and the other 93). 
While inshore fishing is of importance to the British fishing popula-
tion, the commercial fishing sector is highly developed. 
Again, West Germany and France produce approximately the same amount 
of fish, yet in Germany this is done with a modern fleet and in France 
with a fleet of small ships, barely modernized. 
Italy. 
The same applies to 
14. It is in this context of the Community's requirements of the fishing 
sector, the financial resources demanded by adjustment to the modern 
situation and the present state' of the Community's fleets that the 
Common rules proposed to cover national financial aids should be con-
sidered. 
Existing Financial Aids to the Fishing Industry 
15. There are two principal types of financial subsidies to be covered by 
the proposed regulation 
1 See Annex II. 
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(a) direct capital grants : The existing financial aids to the fishing 
industry vary ccnsiderably. The differences in the structure of the 
national fleets is partly (in addition to the geographical and historical 
factors) a reflection of this fact. 
The differences are much more evident when one examines the maximum subsi-
dies and interest subsidies accorded (as a percentage of the total costs of 
a particular project). The following picture emerges : 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
National projects 
10% 
0 
15% 
20% 
40% 
20% 
20% 
30% 
Regional projects 
(20%) 
25% 
75% 
(b) subsidized interest rates (in which the subsidized element is 
expressed as the difference between the level of the market rate of 
interest and the level of the subsidized rate of interest, multiplied 
by the number of years over which the loan is to be covered). 
Most Member States have schemes which act to subsidize interest rates, 
but these schemes vary greatly in terms of their importance, the amounts 
covered (either defined in terms of a percentage of the loan or as a 
fixed ceiling) and interest rates (which vary from 2 - 9%) • 
16. Harmonization of these different schemes must obviously seek to bring 
the maximum aids permitted within defined ceilings which are not so low 
as to inhibit restructuring nor too high to render the attempt at 
harmonization meaningless. 
17. Any figures must needs be arbitrary, in a field where even experts 
disagree, further developments in the international law of the sea are 
awaited and the requirements of the different fleets of Member States 
vary greatly. 
One way the Commission proposes to overcome their difficulties is by 
the derogations for particularly unfavoured regions. 
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Regional Derogations 
18. There are two main derogations from the Cornman rules proposed to cover 
permitted financial aids. The first of these concerns those regions where 
the structural conditions are particularly unfavourable with regard to the 
fishing industry. In such regions, the maximum amounts of aid may be 
increased, but not by more than seven points. 
19. The rules for the application of the provisions relating to the special 
conditions for the special regions are given in Article 16 of Regulation 
(EEC) No. 2722/72. 
r.;·J is Article provides that matters shall be referred to the Standing 
Committee for the Fishing Industry either by its Chairman or at the 
request of a Member State. The opinion of the Committee shall be 
adopted by a 12 vote majority, the votes of the Member States being 
1 
weighted as laid down in Article 148(2) of the Treaty. If the 
measures proposed by the Cornmission conflict with the opinion of the 
Cornmittee, the Council may adopt a different decision according to 
2 the voting procedure laid down in Article 43(2) of the Treaty. 
20. These provisions provide a framework for the process by which decisions 
are to be taken but do little to elucidate the basis on which they are 
to be reached. 'l'he Standing Committee on the Pishing Industry will 
deliberate on the basis of criteria yet to be decided. Here is one 
provision which might allow for a watering down of the commission's 
attempts to limit future national aids within a meaningful range. The 
establishment of the regions to benefit from special derogations is a 
task essentially political in l'.l:t:ure and should be undertaken at the outset 
by the appropriate political bodies. This is especially true given that 
the proposed derogations for unfavoured regions are at best minimal and 
will in most likelihood be gradually extended. 
21. Moreover, the problem is not merely political; it is equally technical. 
The fishing population is not concentrated into compact regions, but 
dispersed in ports along the coasts. And this is especially true of that 
section of the fishing population most in need of aid for structural 
reform, namely the self-employed. The 'regions', in fact, may be coasts 
of many hundreds of kilometres in length, such as North West Britain, 
Brittany or Southern Italy. Ireland wishes to claim its entire area 
as an unfavoured region for fishing. 
22. The problem, of course, is one of finding the appropriate balance : limit-
ing the regions where derogat:j ons are to be made but taking the nec;~ssary 
special regional needs into account in this process of harmonization. 
As follows : Belgium 5, Denmark 3, Germany 10, F'rance 10, Ireland 3, Italy 
10, Luxembourg 2, Netherlands 5 and United Kingdom 10. 41 votes in 
favour are required from at least six members. 
- -------1 ~--- L~- ~---•--•-
Here it should be noted that for the modern, multi-purpose vessels, 
geographical mobility is increased: greater emphasis on structural 
reform will reduce the necessity for regional derogations. 
Derogations for Producer Groups 
23. The second derogation from the Common rules covering financial aids is 
that for producer groups. Article 7 of the proposed regulation lays 
down that operations to restructure fishing fleets or other production 
means and to adapt marketing and production, under Article 2(A) (a), 
(b) or (d) or Article 3, when undertaken by producers who are members 
of a recognised organization within the meaning of regulation 2142/70 
may receive an increase in aid up to five points. 
The producer organizations referred to are any recognised organization 
or association of such organizations, established on producers' own 
initiative for the purpose of taking such measures as will ensure that 
fishing is carried out along rational lines and that conditions for the 
sale of their products are improved.! 
The Role of Producer Groups 
24. The fishing industry has made considerable progress in the vertical 
integration of production and processing. Yet such progress requires 
considerable capital resources in a sector where the artisan element 
remains strong, especially in certain countries such as France, Ireland 
and Italy. 
25. The future is linked with the 'global' company able to integrate produc-
tion, processing and marketing. Large units, developed organizations 
and research programmes are required, which, in turn, demand considerable 
financial resources. One result has been that the European market, in 
which the United Kingdom and Germany play a major role, has become 
dominated by the larger international companies, such as Unilever and 
Findus (Nestle) • 
In order to reduce the dominance of the larger companies arising fromthese 
financial demands and so improve the standard of living and future 
economic viability of the smaller scale fisherman, as well as protecting 
the interests of tle consumer, a number of countries, and in particular 
Denmark and Sweden, have encouraged producers' cooperatives as a balanc-
ing force. 
1 As laid down in Regulation (EEC) 2142/70, as amended by Regulation(EEC) 
170/71 and Regulation (EEC) 1939/72. 
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These demands for measures to strengthen producers' groups is a recogni-
tion of the fact that the larger international companies have already es-
tablished their own 'common market' which threatens to limit competition. 
26. 1 In 1968 the Committee on Agriculture in the Kriedemann Report, as well 
as the Economic and Social Committee, 2 in its consideration of the Com-
mission's proposals for a common structural policy for the sea-fishing 
industry, insisted upon the importance of encouraging the development of 
producer groups by means of special aids. In accepting the present pro-
posed derogations for producer groups, the Committee on Agriculture seeks 
to reaffirm the importance of a line of policy it has advocated in the past. 
The Scope of a Structural Policy in the Fishing Sector 
27. This line of argument can be carried much further, and while we are here 
concerned with Common rules for the implementation of policy measures 
already adopted, these proposed rules, as the Committee on Agriculture 
has noted in the past, do raise wider questions on that structural policy. 
28. The Committee on Agriculture, in the Kriedemann Report, insisted upon 
the necessity for a structural policy in the fishing sector to go beyond 
a mere coordination of national measures, so that a true common policy 
should be achieved based on some common financial responsibility for 
1 
2 
1 
common measures. 
The Economic and Social Committee gave further precision to this line of 
thought in declaring that proposals for the coordination of structural 
policy should be drawn up so as to constitute a transitional stage to a 
real common structural policy. 
would need to be elaborated. 
Measures, based on common criteria, 
While recognising the problems involved in developing policy in this 
area - complicated by the uncertainties engendered by the forthcoming 
conference on the law of the sea - it is to be regretted that a true 
common structural policy for the fishing industry does not exist, except 
in the special area of salt cod-fishing, 3 and that the present proposals 
do little to further the competence of the Community. This is especially 
true if one refers to the absence of Community based criteria for the 
establishment of the regions to benefit from special derogations from 
the common ruleG. 
O.J. No. C 116, 1968, p. 12 
O.J. No. C 116, 1968, p. 13-14 
Reg. (EEC) No. 2722/73, O.J. No. L 291/72 
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Further Safeguards 
29. In addition to these broader questions of policy orientation, there are 
a number of points to be raised, and in particular those which relate to 
safeguards to prevent abuse of the presently proposed measures. 
30. Under Article 7 of the proposed regulation, producers who are members of 
a recognised producers' organization may have their percentages fixed in 
Article 5 and 6 increased by 5 points. The definition of producers' 
organizations, given in Regulation (EEC) No. 2142/70 as amended by 
Regulation (EEC) No. 170/71 and Regulation (EEC) No. 1939/72, is not 
very restrictive: requirements for recognition as a producers' 
organization are limited to little more than common marketing rules and 
a sufficient economic activity. This might provide a loophole for the 
exploitation of these proposed regulations. 
Article 5(1) of Regulation No. 2142/70 reads as follows: 
1. For the purpose of this Regulation, 'producers' organization' means 
any recognised organization or association of such organizations, 
established on producers' own initiative for the purpose of taking such 
measures as will ensure that fishing is carried out along rational lines 
and that conditions for the sale of their products are improved. 
These measures, which shall be designed in particular to promote 
implementation of fishing plans, concentration of supply and 
regularization of prices, shall require members: 
- to dispose of their total output of the product or products by 
reason of which they have become members through the organization: 
the organization may decide that this requirement can be waived if 
products are disposed of in accordance with common rules 
established in advance; 
- to apply, with regard to production and marketing, rules which 
have been adopted by the organization with the particular aim of 
improving product quality and adapting the volume of supply to 
k . l mar et requirements. 
Article 2(1) of Regulation No. 170/71 reads as follows: 
1. Producers' organizations must, in so far as the product or products 
for which they apply for recognition are concerned, comply with the 
conditions laid down in Article 5(1) of Regulation (EEC) No. 2142/70 
and with the following requirements: 
(a) they must show that they are sufficiently active economically; 
1o.J. No. L236/70, p. 1 
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(b) they must not discriminate between Community producers or 
groups of producers within an economic area, particularly on 
grounds of nationality or place of establishment; 
(c) they must have the necessary legal status under national 
legislation; 
(d) they must include in their rules: 
- the obligation to keep separate accounts for the activities 
for which recognition is granted; 
- provisions to ensure that members wishing to leave the 
organization are free to do so provided that they notify 
the organization of their intention at least one year in 
1 
advance. 
31. Similar considerations apply to Article 3 of the proposed regulation 
concerning aids for processing and marketing. If the purpose is to 
encourage true cooperatives rather than to help the larger companies, 
it would seem advisable to establish a ceiling on permitted aids for 
processing and marketing. 
32. Again, under Article 2.B.b it is necessary to ensure that aids to 
compensate for losses in the search for new fishing grounds or for 
technical, scientific or oceanographic research in respect of fishing 
should not provide a loophole by which aid is given to non-viable 
fishing activities. A ceiling would seem to be required here as 
well. 
33. Other aids granted by Member States, especially those designed to 
compensate the fishing sector against increased costs due to the 
oil crisis, are covered by Article 92 of the EEC Treaty. 
1 O.J. No. L2~ /71, p. 11 
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CONCLUSIONS : 
34. These present proposals are concerned principally in introducing common 
rules to govern financial aids to the fishing industry as laid down in 
Article 9, Regulation (EEC) No. 2141/70 of 20 October 1970. 
35. While it may be true that these measures are concerned in implementing 
a policy already established, they raise, nevertheless, questions of 
broad policy as well as points of a more technical nature. 
36. Firstly, the decision of the Commission to follow a policy long advocated 
in the Conunittee on Agriculture, of encouraging producer organizations 
through special financial provision, is to be welcomed. 
37. Again, the necessity to safeguard the interests of unfavoured regions in 
the process of aid harmonization is to be recognised. 
38. On the other hand, the need for a longer term policy to develop a true 
common structural policy for the fishing industry is not to be overlooked. 
The complete absence of such a viewpoint, and in particular the omission 
of any reference to a common financial responsibility for structural 
policy or Community criteria in establishing the unfavoured regions, is 
to be regretted. 
There exists a danger in any proposal for the harmonization of national 
legislation, that the principal result will be simply to bring increasing 
uniformity between the national systems without the development of a 
global policy to meet the real needs of the Community and the interests 
of the sections of the population affected. What is required, rather, 
is for overall principles to be enunciated which will allow for a pro-
gressive and rational development of a structural policy for the fishing 
industry. 
39. This general conclusion is brought into evidence by two omissions from 
the Commission's proposals which might lead one to think that certain 
aspects of the Commission's proposals need to be reconsidered. 
The first of these is the complete absence of any reference to the 
interests of the consumer. 
The second concerns the context in which these proposals are framed 
the need to harmonize the aids granted to the fishing industry, but with-
out any reference to the competition faced by the Community producer from 
the fishing fleets of Third Countries. Can it be considered completely 
wise to limit aid granted to fish producers of the Community when foreign 
fleets are taking larger and larger catches from waters around the 
Community's coasts? 
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It would appear that the Commission's present proposals have been framed 
entirely with reference to the internal demands of aid harmonization and 
without consideration having been given to the position of the Conununity 
vis-a-vis competing third countries. The very considerable financial 
demands imposed by such a wider international competition will have to 
be borne in mind. 
40. On the other hand, it would seem to be unwise to develop firm policy 
directions until the position of third countries fishing in waters off 
the Conununity's shores1 or traditionally the grounds of Conununity fisher-
men, has been defined by the Third Conference of the law of the sea which 
is to take place shortly. 
Such considerations cast doubt as to the wisdom of proposing measures to 
harmonize and limit aid granted to the fishing industry at this present 
1 
moment. 
41. Beyond these considerations, certain of the proposals presented contain 
very broad provisions which might allow loopholes for abuse and should be 
re-examined, anc'l. in particular : 
1 
2 
- given the fact that under Article 7 of the proposed regulation, 
producers who are members of a recognised producers' organization 
may have their percentages fixed in Articles 5 and 6 increased by 
5 points, the definition of producers' organizations, given in 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2142/70 as amended by Regulation (EEC) No. 170/71 
and Regulation (EEC) No. 1939/72, is not sufficiently restrictive; 2 
- similarly with reference to Article 3 of the proposed regulations 
concerning aids for processing and marketing, if the purpose is to 
encourage true cooperatives rather than to help the larger companies, 
it would seem advisable to establish a ceiling on permitted aids for 
processing and marketing; 
One is talking here, of course, of a possible evolution in the competitive 
position of the Community fishing industry vis-a-vis third country competi-
tors, and in particular by the extension of territorial waters and zones of 
control, rather than of legal limitations on the competence of the Conununity 
to develop a particular regime. At the Third Conference of the law of the 
Sea, the Community will have the possibility of following the line adopted 
in 1964 and given form in Article 10 of the Treaty of Lond01, which stipulate£ 
that 'no disposition of the (present) Treaty can form an obstacle to the main-
tenance or the establishment of a special regime for fishing between the 
members of the Community. 
See paragraph 23, supra. 
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- again, under Article 2.B.b, to ensure that aids to compensate for 
losses in the search for new fishing grounds or for technical, 
scientific or oceanographic research in respect of fishing should 
not provide a loophole by which aid is given to non-viable fishing 
activities, a ceiling would seem to be required. 
42. Subject to these reservations, the Committee on Agriculture approves the 
Commission's proposals, and awaits provisions for the further develop-
ment of a common structural policy for the fishing industry as previously 
requested by the Committee on Agriculture. 
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Annex I 
Landings of fish by country (1000 metric tons) 
1968 1969 1970 1971 
Belgium 68.2 58.7 53.4 60.2 
Denmark 1,466.8 1,275.4 1,222.5 1,400.9 
France 803.1 770. 5 764.4 741. 7 
Germany 682.3 651.6 621. 9 507.6 
Ireland 53.1 66.5 78.9 74.0 
Italy 363.8 370.9 386.7 391. 2 
Netherlands 323.3 323.2 300.7 321. 2 
United Kingdom 
1,041.2 1,083.0 999.0 1,107.3 
Japan 8,670.2 8,613.4 9,314.6 9,894.5 
Norway 2,855.7 2.490.7 2,980.4 3.074,9 
USSR 6,052.1 6,498.4 7,252.2 7,336.7 
(Source F.A.O. Yearbook of Fishery Statistics Vol. 32) 
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Annex II 
Landing of fish by zone in which caught and by country (1971) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Nether-
lands 
United 
Kingdom 
Japan 
Norway 
USSR 
ATLANTIC 
Inland mr ................ NE ........................... Central .............. SW .............. SE....... Mediterranean Others 
& Black Sea 
60.2 13.7 
12.9 0.6 1,387.4 
50.8 592.l 47.7 49.9 1. 2 
15.0 135.4 357.2 
74.0 
18.7 66.6 305.9 
3.0 318.2 
7.6 1,099.7 
49.6 59.0 3,677.0 114. 3 357. 2 13.7 355.8 1. 2 
51. 5 0.3 119.4 3.1 115.6 2,554.0 
34.4 2,837.7 262.8 
1,021.5 1,377.5 801. 0 26.2 438.6 263.7 3,408.2 
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Belgium/Luxembourg 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Iceland 
Norway 
USSR 
F I S H 
Imports 
48. 0 
125.8 
122.8 
216.1 
3.9 
122.2 
44.8 
96.8 
0.0 
34.4 
22.0 
Annex III 
Exports 
24.1 
204.5 
26.8 
61. 2 
13.3 
29.4 
98.0 
78.5 
151.4 
150.2 
261.0 
(1971) 
Annex IV 
Production of frozen Fish Fillets (1971) 1000 metric tonnes. 
Denmark 40.0 
France 13.7 (1967) 
Germany 84.0 
Ireland 0.6 
Netherlands 7.6 
United Kingdom 94.2 
Iceland 74.3 
Norway 111. 3 (1970) 
USSR 60.7 
